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Abstract—Word obfuscation or substitution means replacing
one word with another word in a sentence to conceal the
textual content or communication. Word obfuscation is used
in adversarial communication by terrorist or criminals for
conveying their messages without getting red-flagged by security
and intelligence agencies intercepting or scanning messages (such
as emails and telephone conversations). ConceptNet is a freely
available semantic network represented as a directed graph
consisting of nodes as concepts and edges as assertions of common
sense about these concepts. We present a solution approach
exploiting vast amount of semantic knowledge in ConceptNet
for addressing the technically challenging problem of word
substitution in adversarial communication. We frame the given
problem as a textual reasoning and context inference task
and utilize ConceptNet’s natural-language-processing tool-kit for
determining word substitution. We use ConceptNet to compute
the conceptual similarity between any two given terms and define
a Mean Average Conceptual Similarity (MACS) metric to identify
out-of-context terms. The test-bed to evaluate our proposed
approach consists of Enron email dataset (having over 600000
emails generated by 158 employees of Enron Corporation) and
Brown corpus (totaling about a million words drawn from a wide
variety of sources). We implement word substitution techniques
used by previous researches to generate a test dataset. We conduct
a series of experiments consisting of word substitution methods
used in the past to evaluate our approach. Experimental results
reveal that the proposed approach is effective.
Index Terms—ConceptNet, Intelligence and Security Infor-
matics, Natural Language Processing, Semantic Similarity, Word
Substitution
I. RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND AIM
Intelligence and security agencies intercepts and scans
billions of messages and communications every day to identify
dangerous communications between terrorists and criminals.
Surveillance by Intelligence agencies consists of intercepting
mail, mobile phone and satellite communications. Message
interception to detect harmful communication is not only
done by Intelligence agencies to counter terrorism but also
by law enforcement agencies to combat criminal and illicit
acts for example by drug cartels or by organizations to
counter employee collusion and plot against the company. Law
enforcement and Intelligence agencies have a watch-list or
lexicon of red-flagged terms such as attack, bomb and heroin.
The watch-list of suspicious terms are used for keyword-
spotting in intercepted messages which are filtered for further
analysis [1][2][3][4][5].
Terrorist and criminals use textual or word obfuscation to
prevent their messages from getting intercepted by the law
enforcement agencies. Textual or word substitution consists
of replacing a red-flagged term (which is likely to be present
in the watch-list) with an ”ordinary” or an ”innocuous” term.
Innocuous terms are those terms which are less likely to attract
attention of security agencies. For example, the word attack
being replaced by the phrase birthday function and bomb
being replaced by the term milk. Research shows that terrorist
use low-tech word substitution than encryption as encrypting
messages itself attracts attention. Al-Qaeda used the term
wedding for attack and architecture for World Trade Center
in their email communication. Automatic word obfuscation
detection is natural language processing problem that has
attracted several researcher’s attention. The task consists of
detecting if a given sentence has been obfuscated and which
term(s) in the sentence has been substituted. The research
problem is intellectually challenging and non-trivial as natural
language can be vast and ambiguous (due to polysemy and
synonymy) [1][2][3][4][5].
ConceptNet1 is a semantic network consisting of nodes
representing concepts and edges representing relations be-
tween the concepts. ConceptNet is a freely available common-
sense knowledgebase ehich contains everyday basic knowl-
edge [6][7][8]. It has been used as a lexical resource and
natural language processing toolkit for solving many natural
language processing and textual reasoning tasks [6][7][8].
We hypothesize that ConceptNet can be used as a semantic
knowledge-base to solve the problem of textual or word
obfuscation. We believe that the relations between concepts
in ConceptNet can be exploited to find conceptual similarity
between given concepts and use to detect out-of-context terms
or terms which typically do not co-occur together in everyday
communication. The research aim of the study presented in
the following:
1http://conceptnet5.media.mit.edu/
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TABLE I: List of Previous Work (Sorted in Reverse
Chronological Order) in the Area of Detecting Word Ob-
fuscation in Adversarial Communication. ED: Evaluation
Dataset, RS: Resources Used in Solution Approach, SA:
Solution Approach
Deshmukh et al. 2008 [1]
ED Google News
RS Google search engine
SA Measuring sentence oddity, enhance sentence
oddity and k-grams frequencies
Jabbari et al. 2008 [5]
ED British National Corpus (BNC)
RS 1.4 billion words of English Gigaword v.1
(newswire corpus)
SA Probabilistic or distributional model of context
Fong et al. 2008 [2]
ED Enron e-mail dataset, Brown corpus
RS British National Corpus (BNC), WordNet, Yahoo,
Google and MSN search engine
SA Sentence oddity, K-gram frequencies, Hypernym
Oddity (HO) and Pointwise Mutual Information
(PMI)
Fong et al. 2006 [3]
ED Enron e-mail dataset
RS British National Corpus (BNC), WordNet, Google
search engine
SA Sentence oddity measures, semantic measure
using WordNet, and frequency count of the bi-
grams around the target word
1) To investigate the application of a commonsense
knowledge-base such as ConceptNet for solving the
problem of word or textual obfuscation.
2) To conduct an empirical analysis on large and real-word
datasets for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness
of the application of ConceptNet (a lexical resource to
compute conceptual or semantic similarity between two
given terms) for the task of word obfuscation detection.
II. BACKGROUND
In this Section, we discuss closely related work to the
study presented in this paper and explicitly state the novel
contributions of our work in context to previous researches.
Term obfuscation in adversarial communication is an area that
has attracted several researcher’s attention. Table I displays list
of traditional techniques sorted in reverse chronological order
of their publication. Table I shows the evaluation dataset,
lexical resource and the high level solution approach applied
in each of the four techniques. The solution approaches
consists of measuring sentence oddity using results from
Google search engine, using probabilistic or distributional
model of context and using WordNet and Pointwise Mutual
Information (PMI) to compute out-of-context terms in a given
sentence.
ConceptNet has been used by several researchers for
solving a variety of natural language processing problems.
We briefly discuss some of the recent and related work. Wu
et al. use relation selection to improve value propagation in
a ConceptNet-based sentiment dictionary (sentiment polarity
classification task) [9]. Bouchoucha et al. use ConceptNet
as an external resource for query expansion [10]. Revathi et
al. present an approach for similarity based video annotation
utilizing commonsense knowledge-base. They apply Local
binary pattern (LBP) and commonsense knowledgebase to
reduce the semantic gap for non-domain specific videos
automatically [11]. Poria et al. propose a ConceptNet-based
semantic parser that deconstructs natural language text into
concepts based on the dependency relation between clauses.
Their approach is domain-independent and is able to extract
concepts from heterogeneous text [12].
III. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
In context to existing work, the study presented in this paper
makes the several unique and novel research contributions:
1) The study presented in this paper is the first focused
research investigation on the application of ConceptNet
common sense knowledge-base for solving the problem
of textual or term obfuscation. While there has been
work done in the area of using a corpus as a lexical
resource for the task of term obfuscation detection,
the application of an ontology like ConceptNet for
determining conceptual similarity between given terms
and identifying out-of-context or odd terms in a given
sentence is novel in context to previous work.
2) We conduct an in-depth empirical analysis to examine
the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The test
dataset consists of examples extracted from research
papers on term obfuscation, Enron email dataset (having
over 600000 emails generated by 158 employees of
Enron Corporation) and Brown corpus (totaling about
a million words drawn from a wide variety of sources).
3) The study presented in this paper is an extended version
of our work Agarwal et al. accepted in Future Informa-
tion Security Workshop Co-located with COMSNETS
conference [13]. Due to the small page limit for regu-
lar/full papers (at most six pages) in FIS, COMSNETS
20152, several aspects including results and details of
proposed approach are not covered. This paper presents
the complete and detailed description of our work on
term obfuscation detection in adversarial communica-
tion.
2http://www.comsnets.org/archive/2015/fis workshop.html
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Fig. 1: Solution framework demonstrating two phases in
the processing pipeline. Phase A shows tokenizing given
sentence and applying the part-of-speech-tagger. Phase B
shows computing conceptual similarity between any two
given term using ConceptNet as a lexical resource and
applying graph distance measures. Source: Agarwal et al.
[13]
IV. SOLUTION APPROACH
Figures 1 and 2 illustrates the general research framework
for the proposed solution approach. The proposed solution
approach primarily consists of two phases labeled as A and B
(refer to Figure 1). In Phase A, we tokenize a given sentence
S into a sequence of terms and tag each term with their
part-of-speech. We use Natural Language Toolkit3 (NLTK)
part-of-speech tagger for tagging each term. We exclude non-
content bearing terms using an exclusion list. For example,
we exclude conjunctions (and, but, because), determiners (the,
an, a), prepositions (on, in, at), modals (may, could, should),
particles (along, away, up) and base form of verbs. We create
a bag-of-terms (a set) with the remaining terms in the given
sentence. As shows in Figures 1 and 2, Phase B consists of
computing the Mean Average Conceptual Similarity (MACS)
score for a bag-of-terms and identify obfuscated term in a
sentence using the MACS score. The conceptual similarity
between any two given terms Tp and Tq is computed by taking
the average of number of edges in the shortest-path between Tp
and Tq and the number of edges in the shortest-path between
Tq and Tp (and hence the term average in MACS). We use
three different algorithms (Dijikstra’s, A* and Shortest path)
to compute the number of edges between any two given terms.
The different algorithms are experimental parameters and we
experiment with three different algorithms to identify the most
effective algorithm for the given task.
Let us say that the size of the bag-of-terms after Phase A
is N . As shown in Figure 2, we compute the MACS score
N times. The number of comparisons (computing the number
of edges in the shortest path) required for computing a single
MACS score is twice of (N−1)P2 times. Consider the scenario
in Figure 2, the MACS score is computed 4 times for the four
terms: A, B, C and D. The comparison required for computing
the MACS score for A are: B − C, C − B, B −D, D − B,
C − D and D − C. Similarly, the comparisons required for
3www.nltk.org
MEAN AVERAGE CO NCEPTUAL SIMILARITY (MACS)
WORD OBFUSCATIO N CLASSIFIER
Fig. 2: Solution framework demonstrating the procedure of
computing Mean Average Conceptual Similarity (MACS)
score for a bag-of-terms and for determining the term
which is out-of-context. The given example consisting of
four terms A, B, C and D requires computing conceptual
similarity between two terms 12 times. Source: Agarwal et
al. [13]
computing the MACS score for B are: A−C, C−A, A−D,
D−A, C−D and D−C. The obfuscated term is the term for
which the MACS score is the lowest. Lower number of edges
between two terms indicate higher conceptual similarity. The
intuition behind the proposed approach is that a term will be
out of-context in a given bag-of-terms if the MACS score of
terms minus the given term is low. The out-of-context term
will increase the average conceptual similarity and hence the
MACS score.
A. Worked-Out Example
We take two concrete worked-out examples in-order to
explain our approach. Consider a case in which the original
sentence is: ”We will attack the airport with bomb”. The red-
flagged term in the given sentence is bomb. Let us say that
the term bomb is replaced with an innocuous term flower
and hence the obfuscated textual content is: ”We will attack
the airport with flower”. The bag-of-terms (nouns, adjectives,
adverbs and verbs and not including terms in an exclusion
list) in the substituted text is [attack, airport, flower]. The
conceptual similarity between airport and flower is 3 as the
number of edges between airport and flower is 3 (airport,
city, person, flower) and similarly, the number of edges
between flower and airport is 3 (flower, be, time, airport).
The conceptual similarity between attack and flower is also 3.
The number of edges between attack and flower is 3 (attack,
punch, hand, flower) and the number of edges between
flower and attack is 3 (flower, be, human, attack). The
conceptual similarity between attack and airport is 2.5. The
number of edges between attack and airport is 2 (attack,
terrorist, airport) and the number of edges between airport
and attack is 3 (airport, airplane, human, attack). The Mean
Average Conceptual Similarity (MACS) score is (3+3+2.5)/3
= 2.83. In the given example consisting of 3 terms in the bag-
of-terms, we computed the conceptual similarity between two
terms six times.
Consider another example in which the original sentence is:
”Pistol will be delivered to you to shoot the president”. Pistol
is clearly the red-flagged term in the given sentence. Let us
say that the term Pistol is replaced with an ordinary term
Pen as a result of which the substituted sentence becomes:
”Pen will be delivered to you to shoot the president”. After
applying part-of-speech tagging, we tag pen and president as
noun and shoot as a verb. The bag-of-terms for the obfuscated
sentence is: [pen, shoot, president]. The conceptual similar-
ity between shoot and president is 2.5 as the number of
edges between president and shoot is 2 (president, person,
shoot) and similarly, the number of edges between shoot
and president is 3 (shoot, fire, orange, president). The
conceptual similarity between pen and president is 3. The
number of edges between president and pen is 3 (president,
ruler, line, pen) and the number of edges between pen and
president is 3 (pen, dog, person, president). The conceptual
similarity between pen and shoot is 3.0. The number of edges
between shoot and pen is 3 (shoot, bar, chair, pen) and the
number of edges between pen and shoot is 3 (pen, dog,
person, shoot). The Mean Average Conceptual Similarity
(MACS) score is (2.5 + 3 + 3)/3 = 2.83.
Algorithm 1: Obfuscated Term
Data: Substituted Sentence S′, Conceptnet Corpus C
Result: Obfuscated Term OT
1 for all record r ∈ C do
2 Edge E.add(r.node1, r.node2, r.relation)
3 Graph G.add(E)
end
4 tokens = S′.tokenize()
5 pos.add(pos tag(tokens)
6 for all tag ∈ pos and token ∈ tokens do
7 if tag is in (verb, noun, adjective, adverb) then
8 BoW.add(token.lemma)
end
end
9 for iter = 0 to BoW.length do
10 concepts = BoW.pop(iter)
11 for i = 0 to concepts.length-1 do
12 for j = i to concepts.length do
13 if (i! =j) then
14 path ci,j = Dijikstrapathlen(G, i, j)
15 path cj,i = Dijikstrapathlen(G, j, i)
16 avg.add(Average(ci,j , cj,i)
end
end
end
17 mean.add(Mean(avg))
end
18 OT = BoW .valueAt(min(mean))
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Fig. 3: ConceptNet paths (nodes and edges) between two
concepts Pen and Blood using three different distance
metrics
B. Solution Pseudo-code and Algorithm
Algorithm 1 describes the proposed method to identify an
obfuscated term in a given sentence. Inputs to our algorithm is
a substituted sentence S′ and the ConceptNet 4.0 corpus C (a
common-sense knowledge-base). In Steps 1 to 3, we create a
directed network graph from ConceptNet corpus where nodes
represent concepts and edge represents a relation between two
concepts (for example, HasA, IsA, UsedFor). As described in
the research framework (refer to Figures 1 and 2), in Steps 4 to
5, we tokenize S′ and apply part-of-speech tagger to classify
terms according to their lexical categories (such as noun, verbs,
adjectives and adverbs). In Steps 6 to 8, we create a bag-of-
terms of the lemma of verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs
that are present in S′. In Steps 9 to 17, we compute the mean
average conceptual similarity (MACS) score for bag-of-terms.
In Step 18, we compute the minimum of all MACS scores
to identify the obfuscated term. In proposed method, we use
three different algorithms to compute the shortest path length
between the concepts.
Figure 3 shows an example of shortest path between two
terms Pen and Blood using Dijikstra’s, A* and Shortest path
algorithms. As shown in Figure 3, the path between the two
terms Pen and Blood can be different than the path between
the terms Blood and Pen (terms are same but the order is
different). For example, the path between Pen and Blood
using A* consists of Apartment and Red as intermediate
nodes whereas the path between Blood and Pen consists of
nodes Body and EveryOne using the A* algorithm. Also,
the Figure 3 demonstrates that the path between the same two
terms is different for different algorithms.
Two terms are related to each other in various contexts. In
ConceptNet, the path length describes the extent of semantic
similarity between concepts. If two terms are conceptually
similar then the path length will be smaller in comparison
TABLE II: Concrete Examples of Computing Conceptual
Similarity between Two Given Terms Using Three Differ-
ent Distance Metrics or Algorithms (NP: Denotes No-Path
between the Two Terms and is Given a Default Value of
4). Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Dijikstra’s Algo
Term 1 Term 2 T1-T2 T2-T1 Mean
Tree Branch 1 1 1
Pen Blood 3 3 3
Paper Tree 1 1 1
Airline Pen 4(NP) 4 4
Bomb Blast 2 4(NP) 3
A* Algo
Tree Branch 1 1 1
Pen Blood 3 3 3
Paper Tree 1 1 1
Airline Pen 4(NP) 4 4
Bomb Blast 2 4(NP) 3
BFS Algo
Tree Branch 1 1 1
Pen Blood 3 3 3
Paper Tree 1 1 1
Airline Pen 4(NP) 4 4
Bomb Blast 2 4(NP) 3
TABLE III: Concrete Examples of Conceptually and Se-
mantically Un-related Terms and their Path Length (PL)
to Compute the Default Value for No-Path
T1 T2 PL T1 T2 PL
Bowl Mobile 3 Office Festival 3
Wire Dress 3 Feather Study 3
Coffee Research 3 Driver Sun 3
to the terms that are highly dissimilar. Therefore if we re-
move an obfuscated term from the bag-of-terms the MAC
score of remaining terms will be minimum. Table II shows
some concrete examples of semantic similarity between two
concepts. Table II illustrates that the terms Tree & Branch
and Paper & Tree are conceptually similar and has a path
length of 1 which means that both the concepts are directly
connected in the ConceptNet knowledge-base. NP denotes
no-path between the two concepts. For example, in Table II
we have a path length of 2 from source node Bomb to target
node Blast while there is no path from Blast to Bomb. We use
a default value of 4 in case of no-path between two concepts.
We conduct an experiment on ConceptNet 4.0 and compute
the distance between highly dissimilar terms. Table III shows
that in majority of cases the path length between semantically
un-related terms is 3. Therefore we use 4 (distance between
un-related terms + 1 for upper bound) as a default value for
no-path between two concepts.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
As an academic researcher, we believe and encourage
academic code or software sharing in the interest of improving
openness and research reproducibility. We release our term
obfuscation detection tool Parikshan in public domain so that
other researchers can validate our scientific claims and use
our tool for comparison or benchmarking purposes. Parikshan
is a proof-of-concept hosted on GitHub which is a popular
web-based hosting service for software development projects.
We provide installation instructions and a facility for users to
download the software as a single zip-file. Another reason
of hosting on GitHub is due to an integrated issue-tracker
which makes reporting issues easier by our users (and also
GitHub facilitates easier collaboration and extension through
pull-requests and forking). The link to Parikshan on GitHub is:
https://github.com/ashishsureka/Parikshan. We believe our tool
has utility and value in the domain of intelligence and security
informatics and in the spirit of scientific advancement, select
GPL license (restrictive license) so that our tool can never be
closed-sourced.
A. Experimental Dataset
We conduct experiments on publicly available dataset so
that our results can be used for comparison and benchmarking.
We download two datasets: Enron e-mail corpus4 and Brown
news corpus5. We also use the examples extracted from 4
research papers on word substitution. Hence we have a total of
three experimental datasets to evaluate our proposed approach.
We believe conducting experiments on three diverse evaluation
dataset will prove the generalizability of our approach and
thus strengthen the conclusions. Enron e-mail corpus consists
of about half a million e-mail messages sent or received by
about 158 employees of Enron corporation. This dataset was
collected and prepared by the CALO Project6. We perform
a random sampling on the dataset and select 9000 unique
sentences for substitution. Brown news corpus consists of
about a million words from various categories of formal text
and news (for example, political, sports, society and cultural).
This dataset was created in 1961 at Brown University. Since
the writing style in Brown news corpus is much more formal
than Enron e-mail corpus, we use these two different datasets
to examine the effectiveness of our approach.
We perform a word substitution technique (refer to Section
V-B) on a sample of 9000 sentences from Enron e-mail
corpus and all 4600 of Brown news corpus. Figure 4 shows
the statistics of both the datasets before and after the word
substitution. Figure 4(a) and 4(b) also illustrates the variation
in number of sentences substituted using traditional approach
(proposed in Fong et. al. [2]) and our approach. Figure 4(a)
and 4(b) reveals that COCA is a huge corpus and has more
nouns in the frequency list in comparison to BNC frequency
list. Table IV displays the exact values for the points plotted
in the two bar charts of Figure 4.
Table IV reveals that for Brown news corpus, using BNC
(British National Corpus) frequency list we are able to detect
4http://verbs.colorado.edu/enronsent/
5http://www.nltk.org/data.html
6https://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼./enron/
(a) Brown news corpus (b) Enron mail corpus
Fig. 4: Bar chart for the experimental dataset statistics (refer
to Table IV for exact values). Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Fig. 5: Bar chart for the
number of part-of-speech
tags in experimental dataset.
Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Fig. 6: Scatter plot diagram
for the size of bag-of-terms
in experimental dataset.
Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
TABLE IV: Experimental Dataset Statistics for the Brown News Corpus (BNC) and Enron Mail Corpus (EMC) (Refer
to Figure 4 for the Graphical Plot of the Statistics), #=Number of. Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Abbr Description BNC EMC
Corpus Total sentences in brown news corpus 4607 9112
5-15 Sentences that has length between 5 to 15 1449 2825
N-BNC Sentences that has their first noun in BNC (british national corpus) 2214 3587
N-COCA Sentences that has their first noun in 100 K list (COCA) 2393 4006
N-H-W If first noun has an hypernym in WordNet 3441 5620
En-BNC English sentences according to BNC 2146 3430
En- Java English sentences according to Java language detection library 4453 8527
S’-BNC #Substituted sentences using BNC list 2146 3430
S’-COCA #Substituted sentences using COCA (100K) list 2335 3823
S’-B-5-15 #Substituted sentences (between length of 5 to 15) using BNC list 666 1051
S’-C-5-15 #Substituted sentences (between length of 5 to 15) using COCA list 740 1191
only 2146 English sentences while using Java language detec-
tion library we are able to detect 4453 English sentences. Sim-
ilarly, in Enron e-mail corpus, BNC frequency list detects only
3430 English sentences while Java language detection library
identifies 8527 English sentences. Therefore using COCA
frequency list and Java language detection library we are able
to substitute more sentences (740 and 1191) in comparison
to previous approach (666 and 1051). Table IV reveals that
initially we have a dataset of 4607 and 9112 sentences for
BNC and EMC respectively. After word substitution we are
remaining with only 740 and 1191 sentences. Some sentences
are discarded because they do not satisfy several conditions of
word obfuscation. Table V shows some concrete examples of
such sentences from BNC and EMC datasets.
We use 740 substituted sentences from Brown news corpus,
1191 sentences from Enron e-mail corpus and 22 examples
from previous research papers as our testing dataset. As shown
in research framework (refer to Figure 1) we apply a part-of-
speech tagger on each sentence to remove non-content bearing
terms. Figure 5 illustrates the frequency of common part-of-
speech tags present in Brown news corpus (BNC) and Enron
e-mail corpus (EMC). As shown in Figure 5, the most frequent
part-of-speech in the dataset is nouns followed by verbs.
Figure 6 shows the length of bag-of-terms for every sentence
present in BNC and EMC datasets. Figure 6 reveals that 5
sentences in Enron e-mail corpus and 6 sentences in Brown
news corpus have an empty bag-of-terms which makes the
system difficult to identify an obfuscated term. Figure 6 reveals
that for majority of sentences size of bag-of-terms varies
between 2 to 6. It also illustrates the presence of sentences
that have insufficient number of concepts (size <2) or the
sentences that have large number of concepts (size >7).
B. Term Substitution Technique
We substitute a term in a sentence using an adaptive version
of a substitution technique originally proposed by Fong et. al.
[2]. Algorithm 2 describes the steps to obfuscate a term in
a given sentence. We use WordNet database7 as a language
resource and the Corpus of Contemporary American English
(COCA)8 as a word frequency data. In Step 1, we check the
length of a given sentence S. If the length is between 5 to 15
then we proceed further otherwise we discard that sentence.
7http://wordnet.princeton.edu/wordnet/download/
8COCA is a corpus of Americal English that contains more than 450 million
words collected from 1990-2012. http://www.wordfrequency.info/
TABLE V: Concrete Examples of Sentences Presented in EMC and BNC Corpus Discarded While Word Substitution.
Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Corpus Sentence Reason
EMC Since we’re ending 2000 and going into a new sales year I want to
make sure I’m not holding resource open on any accounts which may
not or should not be on the list of focus accounts which you and your
team have requested our involvement with.
Sentence length is not be-
tween 5 to 15
EMC next Thursday at 7:00 pm Yes yes yes. First noun is not in
BNC/COCA list
BNC The City Purchasing Department the jury said is lacking in experienced
clerical personnel as a result of city personnel policies
Sentence length is not be-
tween 5 to 15
BNC Dr Clark holds an earned Doctor of Education degree from the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma
First noun does not have a
hypernym in WordNet
TABLE VI: Example of Term Substitution using COCA Frequency List. NF= First Noun/ Original Term, ST= Substituted
Term. Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Sentence NF Freq ST Freq Sentence
Any opinions expressed
herein are solely those of the
author.
Author 53195 Television 53263 Any opinions expressed
herein are solely those of the
television.
What do you think that should
help you score women.
Score 17415 Struggle 17429 What do you think that should
help you struggle women.
This was the coolest calmest
election I ever saw Colquitt Po-
liceman Tom Williams said
Election 40513 Republicans 40515 This was the coolest calmest
republicans I ever saw Colquitt
Policeman Tom Williams said
The inadequacy of our library
system will become critical un-
less we act vigorously to cor-
rect this condition
Inadequacy 831 Inevitability 831 The inevitability of our library
system will become critical un-
less we act vigorously to cor-
rect this condition
Algorithm 2: Text Substitution Technique
Data: Sentence S, Frequency List COCA, WordNet
DataBase WDB
Result: Substituted Sentence S′
1 if (5 < S.length < 15) then
2 tokens←S.tokenize()
3 POS ←S.pos tag()
4 NF ←token[POS.indexOf(”NN”)]
5 if (COCA.has(NF ) AND
WDB .has(NF.hypernym)) then
6 lang ← S.Language Detection
7 if (lang == ”en”) then
8 FNF ←COCA.freq(NF)
9 FNF ′ ← COCA.nextHigherFreq(FNF )
10 NF ′ ← COCA.hasFrequency(FNF ′ )
11 S′ ← S.replaceFirst(NF, NF’)
12 return S’
end
end
end
In Steps 2 and 3, we tokenize the sentence S and apply part-
of-speech tagger to annotate each word. In Step 4, we identify
the first noun NF from this word sequence POS. In Steps
5, we check if NF is present in COCA frequent list and
has an hypernym in WordNet. If the condition satisfies then
we detect the language of the sentence using Java language
detection library9. If the sentence language is not English then
we ignore it and if it is English then we further process it.
In Steps 8 to 11, we check the frequency of NF in COCA
corpus and replace the term in the sentence by a new term
NF ′ with the next higher frequency in COCA frequency list.
This new term NF ′ is the obfuscated term. If NF has the
highest frequency in COCA corpus then we substitute it with
the term which appears immediate before NF in frequency
list. If two terms have the same frequency then we sort those
terms in alphabetical order and select immediate next term to
NF for substitution. Table VI shows some concrete examples
of substituted sentences taken from Brown news corpus and
Enron e-mail corpus. In Table VI, Freq denotes the frequency
of first noun and it’s substituted term in COCA frequency
list. Table VI also shows an example where two terms have
the same frequency. We replace the first noun with the term
that has equal frequency and is next immediate to NF in
alphabetical order.
9https://code.google.com/p/language-detection/
TABLE VII: List of Original and Substituted Sentences used as Examples in Papers on Word Obfuscation in Adversarial
Communication. Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Original Sentence Substituted Sentence Result
1 the bomb is in position [3] the alcohol is in position alcohol
2 copyright 2001 south-west airlines co all rights
reserved [3]
toast 2001 southwest airlines co all rights re-
served
southwest
3 please try to maintain the same seat each class [3] please try to maintain the same play each class try
4 we expect that the attack will happen tonight [2] we expect that the campaign will happen tonight campaign
5 an agent will assist you with checked baggage [2] an vote will assist you with checked baggage vote
6 my lunch contained white tuna she ordered a
parfait [2]
my package contained white tuna she ordered a
parfait
package
7 please let me know if you have this information [2] please let me know if you have this men know
8 It was one of a series of recommendations by the
Texas Research League [2]
It was one of a bank of recommendations by the
Texas Research League
recomm.
9 The remainder of the college requirement would
be in general subjects [2]
The attendance of the college requirement would
be in general subjects
attendance
10 A copy was released to the press [2] An object was released to the press released
11 works need to be done in Hydrabad [1] works need to be done in H H
12 you should arrange for a preparation of blast [1] you should arrange for a preparation of daawati daawati
13 my friend will come to deliver you a pistol [1] my friend will come to deliver you a CD CD
14 collect some people for work from Gujarat [1] collect some people for work from Musa Musa
15 you will find some bullets in the bag [1] you will find some pen drives in the bag pen drives
16 come at Delhi for meeting [1] come at Sham for meeting Sham
17 send one person to Bangalore [1] send one person to Bagu Bagu
18 Arrange some riffles for next operation [1] Arrange some DVDs for next operation DVDs
19 preparation of blast will start in next month [1] preparation of Daawati work will start in next
month
Daawati
20 find one place at Hydrabad for operation [1] find one place at H for operation H
21 He remembered sitting on the wall with a cousin,
watching the German bomber fly over [5]
He remembered sitting on the wall with a cousin,
watching the German dancers fly over
German
22 Perhaps no ballet has ever made the same impact
on dancers and audience as Stravinsky’s ”Rite of
Spring [5]
Perhaps no ballet has ever made the same im-
pact on bomber and audience as Stravinsky’s
”Rite of Spring
bomber
In Fong et. al.; they use British National Corpus (BNC) as
word frequency list. We replace BNC list by COCA frequency
list because it is the largest and most accurate frequency data
of English language and is 5 times bigger than the BNC
list. The words in COCA are divided among a variety of
texts (for example, spoken, newspapers, fiction and academic
texts) which are best suitable for working with common sense
knowledge base. In Fong et. al; they identify the sentence to
be in English language if NF is present in BNC frequency
list. Since the size of BNC list is comparatively small, we use
Java language detection library for identifying the language of
the sentence [14]. Java language detection library supports 53
languages and is much more flexible in comparison to BNC
frequency list.
C. Experimental Results
TABLE VIII: Accuracy Results for Brown News Corpus
(BNC) and Enron Mail Corpus (EMC). Source: Agarwal et
al. [13]
Total Sen-
tences
Correctly
Identified
Accuracy
Results
NA
BNC 740 573 77.4% 46
EMC 1191 629 62.9% 125
TABLE IX: Concrete Examples of Sentences with Size of
Bag-of-terms (BoT) Less Than 2. Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Corpus: Sentence BoT: Size
BNC: That was before I studied both []: 0
BNC: The jews had been expected [jews]: 1
BNC: if we are not discriminating in
our cars
[car]: 1
EMC: What is the benefits? [benefits]: 1
EMC: Who coined the adolescents? [adolescents]: 1
EMC: Can you help? his days is 011
44 207 397 0840 john
[day]: 1
1) Examples from Research Papers (ERP): As described
in section V-A, we run our experiments on examples used
in previous papers. Table VII shows 22 examples extracted
from 4 research papers on term obfuscation (called as ERP
dataset). Table VII shows the original sentence, substituted
sentence, research paper and the result produced by our tool.
Experimental results reveal 72.72% accuracy of our solution
approach (16 out of 22 correct output).
2) Brown News Corpus (BNC) and Enron Email Corpus
(EMC): To evaluate the performance of our solution approach
we collect results for all 740 and 1191 sentences from BNC
and EMC datasets respectively. Table VIII reveals an accuracy
TABLE X: Concrete Examples of Sentences with the Presence of Technical Terms and Abbreviations. Source: Agarwal
et al. [13]
Sentence Tech Terms Abbr
#4. artifacts 2004-2008 maybe 1 trade a day. Artifacts -
We have put the interview on IPTV for your viewing pleasure. Interview, IPTV IPTV
Will talk with KGW off name. - KGW
We are having males backtesting Larry May’s VaR. backtesting VAR
Internetworking and today American Express has surfaced. Internetworking -
I do not know their particles yet due to the Enron PRC meeting conflicts. Enron PRC
The others may have contracts with LNG consistency owners. - LNG
TABLE XI: Concrete Examples of Long Sentences (Length of Bag-of-terms >= 5) Where Substituted Term is Identified
Correctly. Source: Agarwal et al. [13]
Corpus Sentence Original Bag-of-Terms
BNC He further proposed grants of an unspecified input
for experimental hospitals
Sum [grants, unspecified, input, experi-
mental, hospitals]
BNC When the gubernatorial action starts Caldwell is
expected to become a campaign coordinator for
Byrd
Campaign [gubernatorial, action, Caldwell,
campaign, coordinator, Byrd]
BNC The entire arguments collection is available to pa-
trons of all members on interlibrary loans
Headquarters [entire, argument, collection, avail-
able, patron, member, interlibrary,
loan]
EMC Methodologies for accurate skill-matching and
pilgrims efficiencies=20 Key Benefits ?
Fulfillment [methodologies, accurate, skill, pil-
grims, efficiencies, benefits]
EMC PERFORMANCE REVIEW The measurement to
provide feedback is Friday November 17.
Deadline [performance, review,
measurement, feedback, friday,
november]
Fig. 7: MAC Score of concepts for each sentence
for Brown news corpus
Fig. 8: MAC Score of concepts for each sentence
for Enron mail corpus
of 77.4% (573 out of 740 sentences) for BNC and an accuracy
of 62.9% (629 out of 1191 sentences) for EMC. ”NA” denotes
the number of sentences where the concepts present in bag-of-
terms are not good enough to identify an obfuscated term (bag-
of-terms length <2). Table IX shows some concrete examples
of these sentences from BNC and EMC datasets. Table VIII
also reveals that for BNC dataset our tool outperforms the
EMC dataset with a difference of 14.5% in overall accuracy.
The reason behind this major fall in the accuracy is that Enron
e-mails are written in much more informal manner and length
of bag-of-terms for those sentences is either too small (<2)
or too large (>6). Also the sentences generated from these e-
mails contain several technical terms and abbreviations. These
abbreviations are annotated as nouns in part-of-speech tagging
and do not exist in common sense knowledge-base. Table X
shows some concrete examples of such sentences. Table X
Fig. 9: Average path length of concepts for each
sentence for Brown news corpus
Fig. 10: Average path length of concepts for each
sentence for Enron mail corpus
also reveals that there are some sentences that contain both
abbreviations and technical terms. Experimental results reveals
that our approach is effective and able to detect obfuscated
term correctly in long sentences containing more than 5
concepts in bag-of-terms. Table XI shows some examples of
such sentences present in BNC and EMC datasets.
We believe that our approach is more generalized in com-
parison to existing approaches. Word obfuscation detection
techniques proposed by Deshmukh et al. [1] Fong et. al. [2]
and Jabbari et al.[5] are focused towards the substitution of
first noun in a sentence. The bag-of-term approach is not
limited to the first noun of a sentence. We use a bag-of-
terms approach that is able to identify any term that has been
obfuscated.
Minimum Average Conceptual Similarity (MACS)
Score: Figures 7 and 8 shows the minimum average con-
ceptual similarity (MACS) score for Brown news corpus and
Enron e-mail corpus respectively. Figure 7 also reveals that
using Dijikstra’s algorithm, majority of the sentences have
mean average path length between 2 and 3.5. For Shortest
path algorithm one third of sentences have mean average path
length between 1 and 2. That means in shortest path metrics,
we find many directly connected edges. In Figure 7, we also
observe that for half of sentences Dijikstra’s and shortest path
algorithms have similar MACS score. If two concepts are not
reachable then we use 4 as a default value for no-path. MACS
score between 4.5 to 6 shows the absence of path among
concepts or a relatively much longer path in the knowledge-
base. Figure 7 reveals that for some sentences A* algorithm
has a mean average path length between 4 and 6. Figure 8
illustrates that using A* and Dijikstra’s algorithm, majority of
sentences have a mean average path length between 3 to 4. It
shows that for many sentences bag-of-terms have concepts that
are conceptually un-related. This happens because Enron e-
mail corpus has many technical terms that are not semantically
related to each other in commonsense knowledge-base. Similar
to Brown news corpus, we observe that for half of sentences
shortest path algorithm has mean average path length between
1 and 2. In comparison to Brown news corpus, for Enron e-
mail corpus A* algorithm has large MACS score for very few
sentences. It reveals that either the concepts are connected by
one or two concepts in between or they are not connected at
all (no-path).
Average Path Length Score: Figures 9 and 10 shows
the average path length between concepts for each sentence
present in the BNC and EMC datasets respectively. Figure
10 reveals that for Dijikstra’s and shortest path algorithms,
80% sentences of brown news corpus have same average path
length. Also majority of sentences have an average path length
between 2.5 and 3.5. Similar to Figures 7 and 8 ”NA” denotes
the sentences with insufficient number of concepts. Figure 9
also reveals the presence of obfuscated term in the sentence.
Since no sentence has an average length of 1 and similarly,
only 1 sentence has an average length of 2. This implies the
presence of terms that are not conceptually related to each
other. Figure 10 shows that majority of sentences have average
path length between 2.5 and 4 for all three distance metrics.
Figure 10 also reveals that for some sentences shortest path
algorithm has average path length between 0.5 and 2. Figure
10 shows that for some sentences all three algorithms have
average path length between 4 and 6. This happens because
of the presence of a few technical terms and abbreviations.
These terms have no path in ConceptNet 4.0 and therefore
assigned a default value of 4.0 which increases the average
path length for whole bag-of-terms.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS
The proposed solution approach for textual or term obfusca-
tion detection uses ConceptNet knowledge-base for computing
conceptual and semantic similarity between any two given
terms. We use version 4.0 of ConceptNet and the solution
result is dependent on the nodes and the relationships between
the nodes in the specific version of the ConceptNet knowledge-
base. Hence a change in the version of the ConceptNet may
have some effect on the outcome. For example, the number of
paths between any two given concepts or the number of edges
in the shortest path between any two given concepts may vary
from one version to another. One of the limitations of our
approach is that as the size of the bag-of-terms increases, the
number of times the function to compute shortest path between
two nodes (and hence the overall computation time) increases
substantially.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We present an approach to detect term obfuscation in
adversarial communication using ConceptNet common-sense
knowledge-base. The proposed solution approach consists of
identifying the out-of-context term in a given sentence by
computing conceptual similarity between the terms in the
given sentence. We compute the accuracy of the proposed
solution approach on three test datasets: example sentences
from research papers, brown news corpus and email news
corpus. Experimental results reveal an accuracy of 72.72%,
77.4% and 62.0% respectively on the three dataset. Empirical
evaluation and validation shows than the proposed approach
is effective (an average accuracy of more than 70%) for
the task of identifying obfuscated term in a given sentence.
Experimental results demonstrate that our approach is also
able to detect term obfuscation in long sentences containing
more than 5 − 6 concepts. Furthermore, we demonstrate
that the proposed approach is generalizable as we conduct
experiments on nearly 2000 sentences belonging two three
different datasets and diverse domains.
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